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ABSTRACT
Why do profit-maximizing entrepreneurs in developing countries use incentive contracts
less than their counterparts in developed countries, despite the fact that such contracts gen-
erate higher productivity? This paper explores the hypothesis that the main alternative to
incentive contracts are based on costly monitoring of inputs supplied. We develop a model of
a dual labor market where both kinds of contracts can co-exist, despite the lack of heterogene-
ity among firms or production tasks. Employers trade off the informational rents that need to
be paid in incentive contracts, with the costs of monitoring in input-based contracts. Work-
ers prefer incentive contracts because they give rise to informational rents; these rents are
sustained by the excess demand for jobs under incentive contracts. Monitoring costs depend
on labor costs, and therefore (endogenously ) on the relative shortage of labor in the economy.
LDC entrepreneurs prefer monitoring-based contracts because of cheaper labor costs. The
social ret urns to the use of incentive contracts exceed the private returns to employers. Con-
sequently, changes in technology, market size, degree of product market competition, output
subsidies or protection from imports enhance growth by increasing wage rates, and therefore
motivating employers to switch increasingly to the use of incentive contracts.

I. INTRODUCTION
Kconouiists int.M'rsttMl in growth and < !< \
f
'l< >p iikmi t have in recent years begun to devote
increasing attention to the determinants of productivity within firms. In the context of
developed countries, interest in the determinants of productivity have stemmed partly from
the awareness (following the empirical work of Abramovitz ( 1952), Solow ( 1957), and Denison
(19(H)) that capital accumulation, HX1) and investments in human capital do not entirely
account for observed differences in growth rates across countries and over time.
In t he context of LDCs as well, recent authors have drawn attention to intrafirm produc-
tivity levels as an important clue to understanding rates of development. This includes both
theoretical as well as empirical economists (e.g., Stiglitz (1989), Katz (1987), Pack (1987),
and Mora wet/ ( 1 * )X 1 )). While further empirical work is needed to gauge the importance of
this factor more precisely, casual empiricism suggests that an important bottleneck on rates
of development arise from the greater slack, absenteeism, and unreliability among managers
and workers, as well as suppliers of important factors, in LDC firms. These cause LDC firms
to have higher costs than their counterparts in the developed countries, thus lowering their
investible surpluses and impeding their international competitiveness. 1
Part of these differences in the levels of factor efficiency may be due to the differences
in human capital of the workforce, or in the availability of infrastructural facilities such as
reliable transport or power. However, the large gaps observed between the total factor pro-
ductivities of similar factories in LDCs and developed countries are unlikely to be entirely
due to the unmeasured impact of such factors. 2 As a result, there is a clear need for identify-
ing other sources of productivity differentials. One such source seems to be the difference in
the structure of contracts between firms and their factor suppliers in developed and underde-
veloped countries. For instance, firms in developed countries appear to enter into contracts
with their workers and suppliers that provide greater performance incentives. But, for such
a factor to serve as one of the explanations for productivity differences, one needs to show
why profit maximizing entrepreneurs in LDCs adopt "inefficient^ organizational practices.
After all. the pursuit of profit should motivate the adoption of contractual forms that lower
1 See, for example Morawetz's (1981) study of the sources of lack of competitiveness in
Colombian textile industry.
2 For example. Pack (19*7) estimates that the total factor productivities of the textile
factories in Kenya and Philippines are about .{() to 50 percent below similar factories in the
United Kingdom.
costs as far as possible.
One possible answer to this may lie in the nature of the legal system or cultural values in
LDCs which makes it difficult for firms to successfully set up and enforce incentive contracts.
In this paper, we develop an alternative explanation for the reluctance of profit maximizing
owners of LDC firms to enter into incentive contracts. Our explanation rests on the argument
that because of the abundance of labor in LDCs, from a private point of view, the costs of
intensive monitoring are relatively lower than the informational rents required in incentive
contracts. As a result, LDC firms have a greater tendency to opt for socially costly monitoring
mechanisms.
Our model also addresses the following questions:
(i) Can variations in productivity across firms in a given industry be accounted for by
variations in the nature of contracts entered into by these firms with their workers and
suppliers? For this to be the case, contractual differences should account for productivity
differences, over and above the role of possible differences in the nature and quantity of
capital equipment, quality and quantity of alternative input supplies, or differential taxes
and subsidies. In other words, is it possible for otherwise homogeneous firms to enter
into different sorts of contracts with their workers, varying in the role of performance
incentives?
(ii) How does the choice of contracting structure depend upon conditions ""external" to the
firm: the degree of competition in the product market, the nature of demand, exogenous
changes in technology, taxes or subsidies, or interest rates? While the literature on the
welfare economics of R&D has devoted considerable attention to the effect of market
structure on the speed, direction and diffusion of new technological developments (for
an overview see Kamien and Schwartz (1982)), there is relatively little literature dealing
with a comparable analysis of the effect of market structure on adoption of efficient
organizational practices. Following Leibenstein (1966), only a few authors (such as
Hart (1983) and Scharfstein (198?)) have explored the connection between internal
organizational efficiency of firms, and the degree of product market competition.
(iii) What are the relevant policy implications? For instance, do private entrepreneurs have
the right social incentive to enter into high-productivity incentive contracts? Or is there
an externality associated with the adoption of such contracts? What are the welfare
effects of government policies such as liberalization of entry by domestic firms into
the industry, protection from foreign imports, export subsidies, restrictions on foreign
investment, or employment subsidization -chemes?
We develop the hypothesis that the relevant private cost of "incentive contra^ ts" is that
they require the owner to pay employees and suppliers certain informational rents." The
theory of incentive contracts has, in recent years, elaborated on the nature of these informa-
tional rents. 3 In contexts involving adverse selection, where agents are privy to productivity-
relevanl information not available to the principal, the payment of such informational rents
is necessary to induce higher outputs in high-productivity states. If they are paid a flat sum.
then agents simply respond to high productivity states with higher levels of slack, i.e., by
rutting back on their effort levels, thereby ensuring a constant performance level. Alterna-
tively, in contexts involving moral hazard, agents receive rents to have an incentive to put
forth high levels of effort; any detected shirking is punished by dismissal of the worker (or
lack of renewal of supply contract) that denies the worker access to future rents. 4 In this
paper, we use principally the moral hazard version of the story along the lines developed by
Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), though the results should generalize to other contexts as well.
The advantage of incentive contracts is that they economize on costs of supervision
and/or induce higher performance levels from workers and suppliers. In the absence of
incentive contracts, firms have to either increase the number of supervisors or accept lower
performance levels, both of which increase the overall input costs. Incentive contracts reward
workers based on the observable consequences of their efforts and, in this sense, they may be
called "output-based" contracts. In contrast, contracts which rely on intensive supervision
of effort or focus on input characteristics that are relatively costless to monitor (such as
hours of work) may be called "input-based." Output-based contracts must entail a rent for
employed workers to whet their interest in keeping their jobs. This rent, in general, cannot
be extracted by firms at the start of employment because once workers have made upfront
payments or produced the output, firms have an incentive to renege on the contract by falsely
claiming that workers' performances have not been satisfactory. This type of employer moral
3 See, for example, Guesnerie and Laffont ( 198-1).
4 See Eaton and White (1982), Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), Foster and Wan (19*
Eswaran and Kotwal (1985), Bulow and Summers (1986), and MacLeod and Malcomson
(1989).
hazard may be mitigated if worker performance is verifiable by third parties, and firms that
cheat in this way are boycotted by workers. However, performance is often difficult to verify
and, moreover, bad reputation does not deter firms that intend to enter the market for one
period, collect upfront payments from a large number of workers, and then close down. 5
We argue that input-based contracts which provide low performance incentives are in-
herently more ''labor-intensive" than output-based incentive contracts. Hence, the choice
between the two systems depends to a large extent on the relative scarcity of labor in the
economy. This is why firms in labor-surplus LDCs may prefer input-based contracts, in con-
trast to firms in more developed countries. Moreover, as labor market conditions tighten with
the process of development, firms are induced to progressively switch towards output-based
contracts.
In our model, homogeneous firms in an industry may choose different contractual struc-
tures: some firms offer long term contracts with high performance incentives induced through
dismissal threats, while others offer short term contracts based on input monitoring. Workers
prefer long term contracts, but the demand for these "good" jobs outstrips the supply, i.e.,
good jobs are rationed. Those unsuccessful in getting a good job obtain employment with
firms offering short-term input-based contracts, and continue searching for a good job in the
future. Good jobs pay higher wages than short-term jobs, with the difference being exactly
equal to the overall productivity difference, making firms indifferent between the two contrac-
tual structures. In the equilibrium of our model, always there is a unique fraction of workers
employed in good jobs, though the allocation of good jobs across firms is indeterminate.
In generating an equilibrium dual labor market, our model is akin to those of Eswaran
and Kotwal (1985), Bulow and Summers (1986), and Esfahani and Salehi-Isfahani (1989).
However, it shows that for dualism to exist among jobs - in terms of their wage rates, labor
productivities, and enterprise capital intensities - there need not be exogenous differences in
the characteristics of firms or tasks, as assumed in those models. In other words, labor mar-
ket dualism can be an endogenous phenomenon independent of technological or behavioral
5
It has also been argued that liquidity constraint on the part of workers can also give
rise to job rents under output-based contracts. However, liquidity constraint is unlikely to
be a significant factor behind job rents because firms do not seem to rank job candidates
according to their asset holding and offering lower wages to workers with greater liquidity.
For debates about the sources of job rents and explanations based on employer moral hazard,
see MacLeod and Malcomson (1990) and Arvan and Esfahani (1989 and 1991).
dualism that may exist in the economy. Recently. Uebitzer and Taylor (1991) have made
a similar point. However, their model generates dualism within each firm and requires nil
certainty in producl demand, which induces (inns experiencing high demand to supplement
their permanent workforce with casual workers. Dualism in our model may exist between
firms and does not require demand uncertainty.
Moreover, in the context of LDCs, if good jobs in the economy are identified with the
modern sector, comparative statics experiments with our model generate relationships that
are consistent with the patterns of sectoral change in the process of economic development. 6
In particular, the proportion of workers employed in good jobs with incentive contracts
increases with an increase in product price (e.g., resulting from market expansion), with
capital accumulation and technological improvements that raise labor productivity, with an
increase in product market competition, with an increase in the availability of credit to
workers, with a fall in the rate of turnover of firms in the industry, and with the rate of
subsidy on sales of output or on employment. In addition, an increase in population lowers
this proportion. The relationship with market expansion and technological change is also
consistent with the stylized facts summarized by Eswaran and Kotwal (1985) for two tier
labor markets in agrarian economies.
In our model, the market has an inefficiently low propensity to enter into incentive con-
tracts: the concomitant payment of informational rents by the employer is a social benefit not
internalized by the employer's private profit motive. The efficiency (or utilitarian welfare)
effect of different policies depend essentially on their effect on the proportion of workers in
incentive contracts: an increase in this proportion lessens the effect of the pecuniary exter
nality and generates a first-order increase in national income. While such policies typically
raise wages of all workers, this is accompanied by increasing inequality between the absolute
levels of wages in the two kinds of contracts.
The above results are derived assuming a perfectly price-elastic demand for the prod-
uct of domestic firms. If this assumption is dropped, then the efficiency effect of increased
product market competition turns out to depend on the price elasticity of final demand. If
the elasticity is sufficiently high, then an increase in the number of firms in the industry en-
hances efficiency. On the other hand, with sufficiently low elasticity, the opposite conclusion
6 For a summary of these patterns see Gillis et al. (1987), Chapter 20.
5
holds (provided incumbent firms earn low profits). So the effect of ''liberalization" of entry
restrictions into the industry - irrespective of whether these pertain to domestic or foreign
firms - is ambiguous, despite the fact that the proportion of workers on incentive contracts
responds favourably to increased competition.
On the other hand, small doses of protection from foreign imports can enhance efficiency,
essentially because the resulting stimulus to domestic production exerts upward pressure on
wage rates, motivating employers to switch towards incentive contracts. Similar effects result
from subsidization of output or employment.
The next section describes the model under the assumption that the aggregate supply
of workers to the industry in question is inelastically given. The comparative statics and
welfare analysis of policy changes are presented in sections III and IV. These are followed
by a final section describing an extension to the context where workers decide to locate in
either a rural sector, or in the industrial sector. This context necessitates incorporation of
effects on migration decisions, in the manner of Harris and Todaro (1970). We show that the
principal comparative static results of the previous sections continue to apply. Parameter
changes that encourage the switch toward incentive contracts in the industrial sector tend
also to encourage migration from the rural sector.
II. THE MODEL
In this section, we develop a discrete-time, infinite-period model of an industry's labor
market. There is an exogenous number (M) of firms in the industry, which is large enough
that the industry may reasonably be regarded as "competitive", in the sense that all firms
take as given product prices as well as the structure of contracts in the rest of the indus-
try. The number of firms is restricted by exogenous entry barriers, such as governmental
restrictions on entry of new firms. There is only one factor of production: labor, and the
number of workers available to work in the industry is exogenously given (equal to N). Each
worker inelastically supplies one (natural) unit of labor in any period at any positive wage.
Assumptions about the nature of effort are described below.
Firms are homogeneous, and share a common production function Af(u), where A is
a parameter representing the current state of technology (including the available stock of
capital), u is the number of (efficiency) units of labor employed, and / is a strictly concave,
differentiable, si rictly increasing function satisfying the Inada conditions /'(O) = oc, /'(-x) =
0.
Each worker chooses a level of effort at the beginning of each period when he is employed
in a firm; this affects the number of efficiency units contributed by the worker in question.
The firm cannot observe the worker's effort level until the end of the period. We assume
that the effort level is not verifiable by third parties unless it is supervised. Therefore, a
high effort level and any payment based on it will be enforceable only if there is sufficient
supervision or if the employmenl contract entails appropriate incentives to be self-enforcing.
Below, we describe two alternative informational environments both of which generate the
same analytical model. In the first environment, the alternative to incentive contracts is
increased supervision, while in the second one, it is lower effort levels elicited from workers.
A. Supervision: A worker either chooses a positive effort level, e, or no effort at all. In the
former case, the worker contributes one effective unit of labor, in the latter none. While
the employer may be able to infer the worker's effort at the end of any period by evaluating
his contribution, this is not verifiable by third parties. To establish to third party contract
enforcers that an employee has not worked, it is necessary to hire a supervisor who monitors
effort. An alternative scenario is where the worker decides whether to purchase necessary
complementary inputs: if these inputs have been purchased the worker can costlessly produce
the product. The moral hazard here pertains to the possibility that the worker or supplier
accepts an "'advance" from the employer for procuring the inputs, and then "disappears."
The supervisor's role in this case is to ensure that the complementary inputs are purchased.
For semantic convenience, we refer to the act of the worker abstaining from shirking or
purchasing the necessary complementary materials as the application of "effort."
To induce the workers to exert effort, the employer therefore has two options. One is to
employ enough supervisors and pay a fixed wage conditional on verification of effort. Such
a contract is then enforced by third parties. The other alternative is to not employ any
supervisors, but to utilise a self-enforcing contract of the following kind: pay a fixed wage in
every period to all employees, and then fire any worker who is believed by the employer to
have shirked in any period.
As Dickens et al. (1989) have pointed out, "shirking" can be interpreted in a broad
sense as any form of employee malfeasance. This includes, for example, stealing output or
production equipment from the workplace.
Of course, for this incentive system to work, at each step there must be sufficient surplus
in the relationship to make it worthwhile for both sides to honor their parts of the contract.
In particular, there must be a mimimum amount of surplus in the firm-worker relationship
beyond the current period. The employee's incentive to work is provided by a wage higher
relative to his opportunity wage, which makes the dismissal option unpleasant relative to
continued employment. The fixed wage is paid by the firm at the beginning of each period
to each retained employee: if wages were to be paid at the end of the period, contingent on
the agent's performance as judged by the employer, there will be an incentive for the latter
to renege on its payment obligation to an employee who has supplied effort. If the wage were
not to be paid at the beginning of the period, then the worker would decide to shirk, since
he would not expect to ever be paid in the future. Finally, the incentive compatibility of
the firm's decision to dismiss a shirking worker is ensured as long as the firm can costlessly
hire another worker at the beginning of the following period under identical conditions. As
will be seen below, the belief amongst workers that they will be dismissed if they shirk is
consistent with the equilibrium of our model where there is excess demand for jobs under
incentive contracts.8
In the first (supervision) option, the supervisor- worker ratio is assumed to be exoge-
nously fixed at 7. So the employment of / productive workers necessitates the employment
of /7 supervisors. In order to produce y — Af(l) units of output, the firm has to employ
/(l + 7) workers in all. We assume that productive workers and supervisors are employed
from a common labor pool, so there is nothing to distinguish the two kinds of workers.
In contrast, the second (incentive) option requires the firm to employ only / workers
in order to produce y = Af(l) units of the final good. Effort incentives are provided by
monitoring the output of individual workers at the end of each period, with nonproduction
punished by dismissal or nonrenewal of the contract in future periods. So the output-based
contract is less "labor-intensive": measured labor productivity will be higher than in an
input-based contract, since the output y is produced with fewer - / instead of 1(1 + 7) -
workers.
Both options are equally attractive to any firm if it is the case that the labor cost of
achieving any given output is equalized between the two contractual forms. Let w and
8 MacLeod and Malcomson (1990) argue that the equilibrium obtained under alternative
beliefs are no more efficient than the one obtained here.
8
(/-, denote the wage paid in the output-based and input-based contracts, respectively. To
achieve an output of y = Af{l), thou, t he input-based contract involves a total labor cost of
;/•,( 1
-f •) )/. whereas the output-based contract incurs cost wqI. Hence both contractual forms
can coexist in the market if and only if
w = W{(1 + 7), (2.1)
i.e., if the percentage markup of the wage in the output-based contract over the input-based
contract wage equals 7. In such a situation, the wage difference between the two contractual
forms exactly compensates for their productivity difference.
Suppose two firms opt for different contractual systems: how many workers will they
respectively employ? Letting /; denote the product price taken as given by cither firm, it is
evident that both firms will hire the same number of productive workers /(^) given by
id
Apf'(l(-^))=w . (2.2)
pA
Both firms will produce the same output Af(l{^)), but the firm with the input-based
contract will employ more workers in all: (1 + 7)'(~|) instead of l(^). However, since it
pays lower wages to each of its workers, its wage bill is the same as the other firm.
This feature of the model, i.e. that firms hiring more workers pay lower wages and are
characterized by lower labor productivity may appear to run counter to the common obser-
vation that larger firms tend to be more capital intensive, pay higher wages, and have higher
labor productivities. 9 Of course, there is no contradiction if the size of the firm is measured
by output or capital stock: it arises only if it is measured by the level of employment. Nev-
ertheless, even this may disappear if we drop certain simplifying assumptions. In particular,
extending the model to allow for diseconomies of scale in supervision and for the endogenous
choice of capital yields relationships among firm size, wage rate, capital intensity, and labor
productivity that are, under reasonable conditions, consistent with the stylized facts (see
the Appendix). Here, we choose to work with the simpler version of the model because it
generates all other results of interest in a much more manageable' way.
B. Multiple Effort Levels: An alternative context is one where there are three effort levels
0, ei and e 2 , where eo > e\ > 0. The effective input of a worker equals his chosen effort
See, for example, Mazumdar 1 L983) and Krueger and Summers (1988).
9
level. It is costless for an employer to ensure that an employed worker is choosing at least
the low effort, e 1? for instance by monitoring hours of work. Morever, this information is
also verifiable by third parties. Input monitoring does not, however, reveal which of the two
positive effort levels the worker has chosen: this is revealed by the output of the worker which
is observed at the end of the period only to the employer (and not to any third party).
In this situation, the two options available to an employer are the following: offer workers
a short-term contract (enforced by third parties) which pays a fixed wage after ensuring that
the worker is choosing at least the low effort level (e.g., that the worker shows up for work).
In this case, the worker will choose the effort level e\. The other option is for her to offer a
self-enforcing long-term contract which pays a fixed wage at the beginning of every period,
provided that the worker generated a contribution of e-i in the previous period.
Refer to a firm choosing an input (resp. output )-based contract an I (resp. 0) firm.
An I firm then solves the following problem: max/ Apf{e\l) — wrf, subject to / > 0. An
firm solves instead max/ Apf(e2l) — w l, subject to / > 0. Reformulating the problem in
terms of choice of efficiency units u, the profit of the former equals Apf(u) — ^u, while of
^ 1
the latter is Apf(u) — ^u. Letting 7 denote the proportion by which worker productivity
in the output-based contract exceeds that in the input-based contract (i.e., 7 = f
2
- — 1),
it follows that employers will be indifferent between the two contracts if and only if (2.1)
holds. Moreover, the two firms will produce exactly the same output, and employ the same
number of efficiency units of work. This implies that the I firm must employ more workers
than the firm: specifically it must employ more workers by proportion 7. So the I firm is
more "labor-intensive." If we normalize e2 to equal 1, then it follows that /(-^) as defined
by (2.2) is the number of workers employed in an firm. The multiple effort model thus
yields equivalent outcomes in terms of wages, employment and profits as the model with
supervision.
We now turn to the wages that a firm using incentive contracts (or, equivalently, an
firm) needs to pay in order to induce appropriate effort incentives. As in the model of Shapiro
and Stiglitz (1984), we assume that in any period proportion s of firms leave and enter the
industry due to exogenous reasons, so that the steady state number of firms stays constant at
M . So, any worker engaged in a long term contract with a given firm may with probability
5 lose this job as the firm goes out of business. Let ft denote the steady state fraction of
10
firms in the industry. Then in any period sMl/3 new vacancies for long term contracts arise
in the newly entering firms. It will turn out that workers strictly prefer a long term contract
to a short term one, so the number of workers competing for these vacancies will equal those
without a long term contract in the previous period (equal to ( 1 - {3)Ml(l + 7)), plus the
number of long term contract workers who just lost their jobs owing to exit of their employer
(equal to sMl/3). Hence the probability that a single applicant obtains one of the new long
term contracts is equal to
This probability is endogenously determined, since (3 is endogenous.
Let r denote the interest rate, and e the effort cost for the worker (in the multiple
effort context this is the incremental cost associated with effort e 2 rather than e.\ ). Also, let
V and V, denote the present discounted utility of a worker respectively employed and not
employed in an firm at the beginning of the current period. As will be seen below, the
wages for short-term contracts adjust so that workers not employed in firms will always
find employment in I firms. Therefore, since in equilibrium firm workers will choose to
applv effort, we have
i/
(l-s)V + sViVo =w -e+ — (2.4)
1 + r
Vi =aV + (\-a W;-e + (2.5)
while
Vi
1 + r
An firm will pay a wage to its workers which ensures that they will have an incentive
to apply the necessary effort. If an firm worker shirks in any period, the present value of
his utility stream will be
\ ', = w +
1 + r
since at the end of the current period the worker will be dismissed, and he will obtain a
present value of V, from the following date. To ensure that the worker does not shirk, the
firm has to pay a wage w which ensures that V > Vs . The lowest wage w at which this
condition is satisfied then must imply that V = V3 , which reduces to the condition that
K -Vi = !i±l)£. (2.6)
1 - s
It follows from this that V strictly exceeds V,-; i.e., a worker strictly prefers an output-based
contract over an input-based contract.
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Let Vi denote j¥p, the per period utility equivalent of the long term utility of an I firm
worker. Using (2.6) to substitute the value of V in (2.5), we obtain
a (1 + r)e
Vi = - + Wi - e.
1 — a 1 — 5
This shows that the per period utility equivalent of an I worker exceeds his current net utility
(wi — e) by a term which reflects the prospect of finding a job in an firm at some date in
the future. Naturally, this term is increasing in a, the probability of finding an job at any
single date. Using (2.3), we may substitute for a to obtain
sP (l + r)e
Vi — V Wi — e. (2.0
(1 - J)(l + 7 ) l-s
l
An increase in /3, the proportion of jobs, thus increases the per period utility equivalent
of a worker in an I firm, since that increases the chances of this I worker finding a job in an
firm in the future.
How does this affect the wages that an firm has to pay? If an I worker has higher
utility, then at any given contract wage, a worker will have lower incentive to apply effort,
since the consequences of being dismissed are now less severe. So an firm will have to react
by paying a higher wage. The exact relationship between Vi and w is as follows. Use (2.4)
to obtain
r + s T/ sViV = w - e +
Then (2.6) implies that
1 + r " " 1 + r
(r + s)e
„, = e + i;t + i- L 5 (2.8)l-s
so a unit increase in V{ must be followed by a unit increase in w to preserve effort incentives.
We wish to reduce the system to one involving only two endogenous variables: the
contract wage, w
,
and the proportion of contract jobs, /i. Using (2.7) and (2.8), we can
express the relationship between wages in the two kinds of contracts:
s/3 (1 + r)e (r + s)eW = Wi + JZ r—
;
-—
1
.
(1-0X1 + 7) l-s l-s
However, (2.1) requires the contract wage to exceed the I contract wage by proportion 7.
Hence
1+7 (3 s (1 + r)e (r + s)e
7 [l — p I - s I + 7 l-s
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2.9)
This expresses the wage that needs to be paid in an firm to ensure the worker doesn't
shirk. As in the analysis of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), this wage is a convex, increasing
function of 0, the proportion of firms in the industry: as it becomes easier for a dismissed
worker to find employment in another firm, a progressively higher wage needs to be paid
to ensure effort incentives. As /3 approaches unity, w approaches infinity. The NSC (no-
shirking-condition) curve in Figure I depicts this relationship.
INSERT FIGURE I
The system is closed by the requirement that the I wage adjusts until the market for
employment in I firms clears. The net supply of workers to I firms equals N — IM0, while
the demand equals .U/( 1 + 7 )( 1 - J). Hence market clearing requires that
N = [p + (l-P)(l + 1))Ml(^). (2.10)pA
Since labor demand is decreasing in the wage, and since an increase in the proportion of
firms will reduce the average per-firm demand for labor (owing to the lower "'labor intensity"
of firms), the relationship between (5 and w is downward-sloping, and is depicted in Figure
I. We refer to this as the LMC (labor market clearing) curve.
Equilibrium arises at the point where the NSC curve and the LAIC curves intersect. Since
they have opposite slopes, it follows that there cannot be multiple equilibria. Moreover, an
equilibrium with an interior value of (3 exists if and only if the intercept of LAIC curve on
the vertical axis exceeds that of the NSC curve, which reduces to the condition that
.1/(1 + 7) 7 I — s
If this condition is violated then there cannot be an equilibrium with any output-based
contracts at all. The unique equilibrium involves p = 0, and a wage for I contracts u- t =
~ 1-3 > which corresponds to the point where the LMC curve intersects the vertical axis
(see Figure II). We summarize the foregoing discussion with
Proposition 1. There always exists a unique equilibrium. It involves a fraction of workers
in output-based incentive contracts which is always less than I. Moreover, this fraction »
positive if and only if (2.11) holds, so in this case both contractual forms are selected by some
firms.
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INSERT FIGURE II
III. COMPARATIVE STATICS
In this section, we consider the effects of changes in some parameters of the model,
ignoring secondary feedback effects through induced changes in the product price. These
may therefore be interpreted to be the complete answer when the demand curve for the final
product is perfectly elastic, e.g. when the good is traded on world markets and the industry
in question has negligible impact on world prices. The succeeding section will, however, relax
this assumption.
Consider first the effect of either technical progress, increased capital availability, or
market expansion in the sense that pA increases. This leaves the NSC curve unaffected,
while the LMC curve shifts upward. The increase in the demand for labor resulting from
technical progress, capital accumulation, or market expansion tends to raise wage rates,
causing firms to switch towards output-based contracts. The increase in f3 serves to reduce
the demand for labor, until the labor market reaches equilibrium. This is consistent with
the perception that as the development proceeds in an given economy, industries gradually
switch towards performance-based contracts. If, as in underdeveloped economies, markets
are very small, capital is scarce, and the technology is primitive, condition (2.11) would be
violated, and all firms would employ workers on short term contracts generating low effort
incentives. As markets or technology develop, condition (2.11) comes to be satisfied, and
a fraction of firms switch over to incentive contracts. This fraction increases with further
development. Industries in more developed countries with access to larger markets, greater
availability of capital, or more advanced technology will, therefore, tend to employ more
workers on incentive contracts. In general, technological progress tends to be accompanied
by organizational innovations that compound productivity increases.
Next, consider the effect of an increase in the supply of labor to an industry, resulting
for instance from population growth. Clearly, again only the LMC curve responds, by shifting
downward, so j3 falls. Increased labor supply lowers wage rates, prompting firms to switch
towards input based contracts. So overpopulated countries tend, ceteris paribus, to have
lower labor productivity, owing to less frequent use of incentive contracts.
What about an increase in the number of firms in the industry, resulting, for example,
from liberalization of entry restrictions by the government, or the diffusion of the relevant
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technology? Th<> effects of I his arc exact lv t he opposite of an increase in the supply of labor:
the LMC moves upward. Entry of new firms increases industry output, and increases the
demand for labor, pushing wages upward, and therefore prompting a switch toward incentive
contracts. This may be viewed as a formalization of the Leibenstein (1966) view that the
degree of "X-efficiency" of an industry is positively related to the degree of product market
competition. 10
Finally, consider changes in the interest rate, r, the firm turnover rate, .s, and the
productivity difference, 7, between the two contractual forms. A decrease in r or s shifts the
NSC curve downward, thereby increasing /3: the reason is that the wage differential between
the two contracts is lower, motivating more firms to adopt incentive contracts. An increase
in 7 affects both NSC and LMC curves: the LMC curve moves upward as the demand for
labor increases, while the NSC curve moves rightward. Both shifts tend to increase i.
IV. WELFARE ANALYSIS OF POLICY CHANGES
The utilitarian measure of welfare in our model reduces to the calculation of aggregate
income of firm owners and workers in the industry in question, in addition to a welfare
measure for consumers of the final product:
W = 0Ml(wo - e) + (1 - 0)M/(1+ 7)Oz - e)+ M*(p, w ) + S(p)
where ir(p, w ) denotes the profit function and S(p) the level of consumer surplus. Any
parametric change will result in changes in the following endogenous variables: (3,w ,Wi,l
and p.
Proposition 2, Consider any parametric change which does not vary either N, the
supply of labor, M , the number of firms, or 7, the productivity differential between the two
contractual forms. Then the welfare effect of this change is positive (resp. negative) if and
only if 0, the proportion of workers on incentive contracts, increases (resp. decreases).
Proof: Note first that except in the case where the NSC and the LMC curves intersect on
the vertical axis, equilibrium variables are differentiable functions of the set of parameters.
10 For an alternative approach at formalizing the Leibenstein idea, see Hart (1983). Hart's
approach, however, runs into some serious problems when his assumptions about preferences
are modified in a plausible fashion: see Scharfstein (198?).
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Use (2.1) to rewrite the expression for welfare as
W = pMlw -l— + N{—?-- e) + Mic(p,w ) + S(p). (4.1)1+7 1+7
Further, if we ignore the effect on per firm employment /, the welfare effect of an in-
finitesimal change in w equals
7 N(5Ml—^- + Ml,
1+7 1+7
upon using the Envelope Theorem. But this expression equals zero as a result of the labor
market clearing condition (2.10). Similar use of the Envelope Theorem and the product
market clearing condition ensures that the welfare effect of a small change in the product
price is zero, ignoring the effect on /.
It therefore follows that the welfare effect of any parameter change which is not asso-
ciated with changes in .V, A/, or 7 depends entirely on the effect on the absolute number
Ml/3 of jobs in output-based contracts. From the labor market clearing condition (2.10) we
obtain the value of this to be
Ml(3 =
1 + (1-/3)7
So, any parameter change which does not affect Ar or 7 increases Mlj3 if and only if it
increases (3. Q.E.D.
This proposition shows that price and wage changes have a zero first-order (direct)
welfare effect, based on the traditional argument for the irrelevance of pecuniary externalities.
So the welfare effect of parameter changes depend entirely on their effect on the number of
workers in contracts. Any change that increases this number implies that some workers are
enabled to switch from an input based contract to an output based contract, with a resulting
discrete increase in their incomes. If the parameter change does not involve a change in
TV, M or 7 then such forms of "worker upgrading"1 occur whenever (3, the proportion of
contracts, increases.
Consider first the welfare effect of a liberalization of entry restrictions into the industry,
resulting in an increase in the number of firms. If the demand for the product is perfectly
elastic, then we have shown above that the effect is to increase f3. Moreover, it can be easily
verified that the welfare effect of an increase in M is the sum of the "worker upgrading"
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effect discussed above (which is positive since increases), and the increase in total industry
profit (equal to the profit of a single firm, which is nonnegative). Therefore an increase in
the number of firms must increase welfare in this case.
What if demand is not perfectly elastic? Then an increase in the number of firms M
will typically lead to a price change, owing to a shift in the industry supply curve; such a
price change will have an independent effect on 0, which needs to be incorporated.
Proposition 3. If demand is perfectly elastic, then an increase in the number of firms
always increases welfare. However, welfare decreases if demand is perfectly inelastic, and if
the profit level of a representative firm is sufficiently small.
Proof: The first part of the result has already been established above. To establish the
second part, we first show that the effect of the increase in M is to shift the industry supply
curve outward, i.e. depress the product price. Industry supply is given by Q = MAf(l).
To simplify notation, normalize A = 1. Hence the effect of an infinitesimal increase in M is
given by
dQ = f(l)dM + f'(l)M.dl,
where, by the labor market clearing condition (2.10). we obtain
Mdl =
,
7
d(i - IdM.
1 + 7(1-/?)
Hence
dQ = [/(/) - lf'(i)}dU + f'(l)—J^l-—dp. (4.2)
i + ( i - p n
Since / is concave and increasing, and increases as a result of the increase in M for any
given value of/?, it follows that the supply curve shifts outward, and the product price must
therefore fall.
If demand is perfectly inelastic, then the ultimate change in industry output must be
zero. From (4.2) it follows that d0 must be negative. Hence if the profit of a representative
firm is sufficiently small, the decline in worker incomes will dominate, and so welfare must
fall. Q.E.D.
With increased competition among firms, there are two countervailing effects: an in-
crease in the demand for labor, which increases wage rates, and causes an increase in 0. On
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the other hand, the price of the product falls, which tends to reduce the demand for labor,
and thereby lower (3. The net result therefore depends upon the price elasticity of demand,
which determines the severity of the latter effect. Of course, this assumes that we neglect
the effect on industry profits: if these are substantial then the increased profit may outweigh
the reduced incomes of workers.
Next, consider the effect of protection of the domestic industry from competition with
foreign imports, e.g. by either tariffs or quotas. This will shift the aggregate supply curve
(of the product to the domestic economy) inward, raising the domestic price (provided of
course that domestic demand is not perfectly elastic, a case in which protection has no effect
on domestic firms). This raises /3, as well as domestic industry profit. So, starting from a
position of free trade, a small amount of import protection can be welfare improving, essen-
tially because the resulting stimulus to domestic production raises wage rates and thereby
stimulates a shift toward incentive contracts. Of course, if the existing level of protection is
high, then the consumer and producer "deadweight" losses may rise sharply and overshadow
the gains from increased productivity.
What about liberalization of restrictions on foreign investment? The result of this is
the same as an increase in the number of domestic firms, except that the profit accruing to
the entering firm no longer enters into the calculation of domestic welfare. By the reasoning
above, the effect then depends entirely upon the effect on (3, which in turn depends entirely
on the price elasticity of demand. If demand is perfectly elastic then the entry of a foreign
firm will increase domestic welfare, while the opposite will be true if demand is perfectly
inelastic.
Finally, we demonstrate that the free market equilibrium involves insufficient motivation
on the part of private employers to enter into incentive contracts with their employees.
Suppose the government subsidizes the sale of output by a small amount and finances the
subsidy in some lumpsum fashion. Alternatively, since labor is the only factor of production,
it could subsidize employment and achieve the same effect (since in either case the result will
be to lower the product wage for private employers). Assume that the subsidy is at a uniform
rate, which does not discriminate between I firms and firms. If demand is perfectly elastic,
then there will be no effect on the consumer price, and the producer price will increase by
the amount of the subsidy. This will increase (3. Moreover, the increase in the profits of
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the firm owners will (by virtue of the Envelope Theorem) exactly equal the financial cost
of the subsidy. 11 So, as long as the opportunity cost of government funds is not too high,
an output subsidy (and therefore also an employment subsidy) will enhance welfare. The
market equilibrium involves "too few" firms utilizing incentive contracts, essentially because
they are forced to share a fraction of the social return from these contracts (i.e., the increased
productivity) with the workers (in the form of informational rents).
V. MIGRATION AND VARIABLE LABOR SUPPLY
In this section, we briefly outline how our model can be extended to a context involving
migration of labor from another sector, in the tradition of the dual economy model of Harris
and Todaro ( 1970).
For simplicity, assume that the alternate sector (hereafter referred to as the rural sector)
is characterized by R farms, each with the production function 61og/i, where h is the number
of workers employed in the farm (that select a level of effort e similar to that in the urban
sector). Moreover, there are no incentive problems in the rural sector: every rural worker
can be made to work e without entailing any extra supervisory costs. There is a total of
T workers in the economy, each of whom decides to locate in either the rural or the urban
sector. The rural sector is perfectly competitive, and both product and labor markets in this
sector clear. The output produced by the rural sector is the numeraire, so p denotes the
terms of trade between the good produced by the urban sector and that produced by the
rural sector.
Given .V, the number of workers locating in the urban sector, the supply of labor to
the rural sector is T — JV, while the demand in this sector is — , where w r denotes the ruraliuT '
wage. Hence the market clearing rural wage level is w r = j^j. The resulting level of rural
profits is Rb log( T
^
lV
) - Rb, while the aggregate utility of rural workers is Rb - (T - N)e.
A rural worker contemplating migration to the urban sector will expect a present value
utility from being in the urban sector which equals the present value utility of an I-worker in
the urban sector (since he will search for an O-contract job upon arrival, and if unsuccessful
11 The increase in profits is given by > M l/(/), where e denotes the subsidy rate, since
the derivative of the profit function with respect to the producer price is equal to the firm's
output Af(l). Hence the increase in profit equals the product of industry output and the
subsidy rate.
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will work in an I-contract job). Migration equilibrium thus occurs when the rural wage equals
the per period utility equivalent of a worker without an contract in the urban sector, i.e.,
w r = V{. This gives rise to the following equilibrium conditions:
N = [1 + (1-/5)7] Ml, (5.1)
1 + 7 (3 5(1 + r)e (r + s)e
w = —— H
7 [l- (31- s 1 + 7 1-5
(5.2)
= w . (5.3)T-N 1
The first two equations respectively represent the I-contract market clearing condition, and
the no-shirking condition in the urban sector, while the third is the migration equilibrium
condition. There are three endogenous variables f3, w and N . To focus on equilibrium
allocation of labor, we substitute out w , to reduce the system to two equations in the two
variables, (3 and N:
Rb Sil + T)e
+1-1, (5.4)T-N 7(l-j)(l-/J) 7
Rb (1 + r)eN = 1 + (1 - (3) 1 }Ml(
™
+
[L }€
-
). (5.5;
pA{l - N ) pA( 1 - s)
INSERT FIGURE III
Figure III depicts the nature of the equilibrium. Equation (5.4) yields an upward sloping
relationship between N and (3, with the property that N — T when (3=1. Equation (5.5)
yields a downward sloping relationship between N and (3. There always exists a unique
equilibrium. This equilibrium has an interior level of (3 if and only if the intercept of the
latter curve on the N axis exceeds that of the former curve, i.e.,
(l + 7)A//(—— — + \ 71 J > T +pA(T-TV) Ml-s) 7 e L7(l- s)-(r + 5)
7(1-5)
(5.6)
Increases in p or A shift the downward sloping curve outward, thereby increasing both
iV, urban sector labor supply, as well as (3, the fraction of workers with contracts. This
is natural: improvement of the terms of trade in favour of the urban sector, or capital
accumulation and technical progress in this sector, will be accompanied by a migration of
workers from the rural sector, since urban sector wages move upward. If we identify urban
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unemployment with those workers in the I sector (seeking jobs in the sector), the urban
unemployment rate is 1 - Q, which therefore goes down. However, the total number of urban
unemployed ,V( 1 - J) may either go up or down, depending on whet her .V is smaller or greater
than y + (l — -) -
—
~
R , . If most workers are in the rural sector, urban unemployment is
likely to rise. As development proceeds and more workers are located in the urban sector,
the volume of urban unemployment decreases with further expansion of the urban sector.
This suggests that the phenomenon of increased urban unemployment as a response to the
increase in the urban sector labor demand (highlighted by the Harris-Todaro analysis) may
be a transitory phenomenon. A similar trend ran exist in the Harris-Todaro model if rural
wages are assumed to be flexible and inversely related to rural employment, while urban
wages are exogenously fixed. But in that case the Harris-Todaro model implies that the
urban-rural wage differential is transitory as well. In our model, on the other hand, these
non-market clearing phenomena persist indefinitely because urban wages are endongenously
determined and the no-shirk condition of incentive contracts always maintains a gap between
urban and rural wages.
We conclude with a discussion of how the welfare results extend. Welfare is given bv
\y = 3\iiw --L- + N—2- + U-[ P . w ) + bR\og{-^— ) + S{p) - Te.I+7I+7 R
As per previous reasoning, we can ignore the direct effect of changes in wages and prices.
In addition, an increase in the number of workers locating in the urban sector results in
a first-order increase in welfare, since the average income of a worker in the urban sector
exceeds that in the rural sector (since rural wages equal the expected wage of I- workers in the
urban sector, which is less than the average wage in the urban sector). Hence policy changes
which increase urban wages and the number of urban workers with contracts - such as an
increase in the number of firms (provided demand is sufficiently elastic), tariff protection or
output/employment subsidies in the urban sector - continue to be welfare improving, since
they additionally encourage migration from the rural sector. Of course, the process may be
accompanied by increased urban unemployment.
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APPENDIX
FIRM SIZE, CAPITAL INTENSITY, AND LABOR PRODUCTIVITY
The model developed in section II implies that if all firms are ex ante identical, then
larger firms (as measured by the number of workers) are those that rely on I contracts
and appear as more labor intensive. This implication does not accord with the common
observation that large firms are more capital intensive, have higher labor productivities,
and pay higher wages. However, our model is consistent with these stylized facts if some
of its simplifying assumptions are altered in reasonable ways. In particular, if there are
diseconomies of scale in supervision, i.e.. the use of I contracts, then I firms may end up
being smaller than firms. 12 Below, we present two examples of such a model. In these
examples, we have endogenized the capital input decision as well in order to make the choice
of technique explicit. Also, to simplify the analysis, we use a Cobb-Douglas production
function, Ak a l e , where k is the amount of capital and a
-f < 1. Let the user cost of capital
be r and let p = 1.
The first example is a situation where the cost of supervision rises very sharply when
more than / workers are employed in the same firm under an I contract. If / is sufficiently
small, then I firms will only employ I workers. As a result, in this case, equation (2.1) does
not apply any more. Instead, when I and contracts coexist, the relationship between w
and w, must be such that firms are indifferent between the two types of contract:
x - wo l - rk = X{ - Wi(l + j)l- rk t , (A.l)
where
x = Aka lB and x,; = Akf
I
9
. (.4.2)
In addition, we have the following first order conditions:
rk w l
x
° =— =
—- {A -3)
X( = ± > *.U+7)/; {AA)
<7
12 See Calvo and Wellisz (1978) for a model of diseconomies of scale arising from super-
vision. An alternative avenue we could pursue is to allow for differences among firms, for
example, in access to capital or technology. But, in line with the rest of the paper, we assume
that all firms are identical ex ante.
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The equilibrium is then defined by (A.l)-(A.l), (2.9), and (2.10).
Using (A. 3) and (A.4) in (A.l) yields
T = = 1 +
rt j X|
Bx
t
- tr,(l +7)/
{-a-0 > 1.
Also, in light of (A. 2), we have
7 =^> 1
i.l.'M
(-4.6)
However, for O firms to be larger by the total workforce count, / must be sufficiently small
to yield l > ( 1 + 7 )/. Note that in this situation, firms will be relatively capital intensive
if
_
\—a-H
ko/ 'o (1+ 7 )T=7
1 + 7)/
> 1, (a:
*.7(l + 7)'
which will hold if 9 and a are large and, as a result, 1 - a — 9 is close to zero.
The second example is similar to the first one, except that instead of devising a limit
on I contract employment, the cost of supervision is assumed to rise with such employment.
Specifically, we assume 7 = A/,. In that case, (A.l) and (A.4) must be replaced by
x - w l - rk = X{ - Wi(l + A/,-)/; - rk{, (A.l')
and
Therefore, (A. 5) takes the form,
rk
t W{( 1 + 2A/,)/,
(-4.4')
w
t XllK X
k{ Xi ( 1 - a - 6)1,
> 1. (-4.5')
Relation (A. 6) remains unchanged, with / : replacing /. In this case, again sufficiently large 9
and a can yield l > ( 1 + A/,)/, while ^ > (1+^ }/ . Since an analytical proof of this claim is
quite cumbersome, we demonstrate these relationships by numerical simulation of the model
with a variety of parameter values (see Tables A.1-A.6).
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Table A.l •
Base Solu tion
a r A s A N M
0.40 0.10 0.10 0.20 2.00 300 100
X Q K lo W x { K j h Wi (3
in ko/lo
Ul + A) /c,//,(l + A)
0.35 14.81 59.23 2.87 1.80 13.54 54.15 2.46 1.29 0.36 0.94 1.17
0.40 16.48 65.91 2.96 2.23 14.53 58.11 2.45 1.59 0.51 0.97 1.17
0.45 18.42 73.67 3.04 2.73 15.30 61.22 2.37 1.97 0.61 1.03 1.16
0.50 20.84 83.35 3.15 3.30 15.47 61.89 2.21 2.43 0.66 1.17 1.15
0.55 24.76 99.04 3.43 3.97 13.68 54.74 1.80 3.08 0.67 1.62 1.12
Table A.
2
The Impact of an Increase in a
a r A s A N M
0.45 0.10 0.10 0.20 2.00 300 100
9 x k l w X{ k{ l
x
W{ j3 kjlcUT+vj k,/i,(i + \)
0.35 43.10 215.50 2.99 5.04 37.25 186.26 2.43 3.61 0.81 0.99 1.17
0.40 48.76 243.82 3.05 6.40 38.22 191.08 2.25 4.69 0.84 1.11 1.15
0.45 56.29 281.45 3.16 8.02 33.86 169.32 1.80 6.25 0.85 1.49 1.11
Table A.3
The Impact of an Increase in r
a r A s A N M
0.40 0.15 0.10 0.20 2.00 300 100
6 x k l w Xi ki li wi (3
lo k /l
l,(l + \) k,/l,(l + \)
0.35 11.18 29.81 2.82 1.39 10.21 27.24 2.42 1.00 0.00 0.94 1.16
0.40 12.50 33.34 2.93 1.71 11.02 29.38 2.42 1.22 0.15 0.97 1.17
0.45 14.13 37.68 3.06 2.08 11.75 31.32 2.39 1.49 0.36 1.03 1.17
0.50 16.24 43.31 3.23 2.51 12.08 32.22 2.27 1.83 0.48 1.16 1.16
0.55 19.99 53.31 3.65 3.01 11.14 29.72 1.93 2.29 0.52 1.59 1.13
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Table A.4
The Impact of an Increase in A
a r A s A N M
0.40 0.10 0.20 0.20 2.00 300 100
035 14.72 58.90 2.S5 LM [2~*3 51.33 2.25 L05 6^63 0.87 1.31
0.10 16.39 65.57 2.93 2.24 13.51 54.06 2.20 1.31 0.71 0.93 1.31
0.45 18.34 73.36 3.02 2.73 13.81 55.24 2.07 1.64 0.76 1.03 1.29
0.50 20.78 83.12 3.11 3.30 13.16 52.64 1.82 2.10 0.78 1.27 1.24
0.55 24.71 OS, s.{ 3.12 3,97 10.07 40.30 1.29 2.85 0.77 2.12 1.16
Table A.
5
The Impact of an Increase in s
a t A s A N M
0.40 0.10 0.10 0.30 2.00 300 100
9 x k l w x
t
k\ /, Wi (3
k /l
o 'o , *,, t w t v /,(i + A) /t,//.(l + A)
(T35 14.65 58.59 2~82 L82 13.38 53.54 2~42 L31 (Too 0.94 1.16
0.40 16.38 65.50 2.93 2.24 14.43 57.73 2.42 1.60 0.12 0.97 1.17
0.45 18.53 74.13 3.07 2.72 15.41 61.63 2.40 1.96 0.31 1.03 1.17
0.50 21.40 85.58 3.26 3.29 15.93 63.72 2.29 2.39 0.43 1.16 1.16
0.55 26.62 106.48 3.71 3.94 14.88 59.50 1.97 2.98 0.48 1,58 1 .11
Table A.
6
The Impact of an Increase in 1
a r A s A N M
0.40 0.10 0.10 0.20 2.50 300 100
" x o ^0 'o W X t fcj /, W r P
i
/
i + \ \ k / 1 ( i -). A
)
(T35 21.66 86.64 2^92 2^60 FoTsi 79.25 2.50 1.85 0.60 0.93 1.17
0.10 23.98 95.92 2.97 3.23 21.14 84.58 2.46 2.30 0.69 0.97 1.17
0.45 26.63 106.51 3.03 3.96 22.12 88.49 2.36 2.86 0.74 1.04 1.16
0.50 29.82 119.29 3.10 4.80 22.11 88.44 2.17 3.56 0.78 1.18 1.15
0.55 34.57 138.26 3.29 5.78 19.00 76.00 1.71 4.55 0.77 1.64 1.11
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